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Abstract This article argues that in early Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ the view was current that
there are objects in the world corresponding to all words of the Sanskrit language.
Evidence to that effect is primarily found in passages from Bhartr
˙
hari’s works, and
in some classical Nya¯ya texts. Interestingly, S´abara’s classical work on Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯
has abandoned this position, apparently for an entirely non-philosophical reason: the
distaste felt for the newly arising group of Brahmanical temple-priests.
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Mı¯Bh Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ Bha¯s
˙
ya de S´abara (ASS 97)
NBh Nya¯yabha¯s
˙
ya of Paks
˙
ilasva¯min Va¯tsya¯yana, in the following edition:
Nya¯yadars´anam with Va¯tsya¯yana’s Bha¯s
˙
ya, Uddyotakara’s Va¯rttika,
Va¯caspati Mis´ra’s Ta¯tparyat
˙
ı¯ka¯ & Vis´vana¯tha’s Vr
˙
tti. Chapter I, section I
critically edited with notes by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and chapters
I-ii–V by Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, with an introduction by Narendra
Chandra Vedantatirtha. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing
House, 1936–1944
NV Nya¯yava¯rttika of Uddyotakara. For the edition, see NBh
Vkp Bhartr
˙
hari, Va¯kyapadı¯ya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977
Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya contains the following two kārikās (Vkp 2.119–120):
asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam/
apūrvadevatāsvargaiḥ samam āhur gavādiṣu//
prayogadarśanābhyāsād ākārāvagrahas tu yaḥ/
na sa śabdasya viṣayaḥ sa hi yatnāntarāśrayaḥ//
These can be translated as follows:
They say that the characteristic of what is to be conveyed is that all words
have things [corresponding to them]; this applies to [words] such as ‘cow’
as much as to [the words] apūrva, devatā and svarga. The grasping of the
form (ākāra) as a result of repeatedly observing the use of a word,
on the other hand, is not the realm of words, for it is based on a different
effort.
Understood in this way, the first of these two kārikās draws attention to an opinion
according to which the existence of a word guarantees the existence of the
corresponding thing. The existence of the words apūrva, devatā and svarga
guarantees that the corresponding things—Unprecedented Potency (apūrva), deities
and Heaven—exist.
The second kārikā specifies that this corresponding thing is not a form
(ākāra). This is a criticism of those who believe that words primarily (or even
exclusively) denote forms. The thinkers whose opinion is here recorded do not
agree, and this allows us to conclude that the things corresponding to words are
individuals, not forms, and presumably not universals either. We will return to
this point below.
This interpretation of Vkp 2.119–120 makes sense, and remains close to the
text. It is also in agreement—or at any rate not in obvious disagreement—with
the one surviving commentary on this passage, the one by Pun
˙
yara¯ja. (The
ancient Vṛtti on this passage has not survived.) Pun
˙
yara¯ja explains the first pāda
as follows:
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sarvaśabdānām aparāmṛṣṭākāraviśeṣam arthamātraṃ vācyam iti kecid āhuḥ
I propose to translate this as follows:
Some say that the mere thing is denoted by all words, without consideration of
the particular form.1
A passage in Bhartr
˙
hari’s commentary on the Mahābhāṣya further supports this
interpretation of Vkp 2.119. It reads as follows2:
atha vārthopalabdhiḥ śabdāstitvānumānam. na hi kaścid artho ‘śabdo ‘sti.
tatra yathaiva svargāpūrvadevatāśabdā upalabhyamānā atyantāparidṛṣṭānām
astitvānumānam evaṃ kiṃ na gṛhyate ‘rtha upalabhyamānaḥ śabdāstitv-
asyānumānam iti.
Or rather, the perception of a thing is the means by which we are able to infer
that the [corresponding] word exists, because there is nothing that has no word
[to denote it]. Just as the words svarga, apu¯rva, and devata¯, when
perceived, enable us to infer that things that are absolutely imperceptible
exist, in the same way, does not a thing when perceived enable us to infer that
the [corresponding] word exists?
The remark about svarga, apūrva and devatā serves as comparison in this passage,
and does not therefore embody an alternative hypothesis but rather a known fact:
these three words enable us to infer the existence of things that are absolutely
imperceptible. Here, clearly, the words svarga, apūrva and devatā are taken to refer
to real objects, whose existence is shown by the existence of these words.
All these passages seem to indicate that Bhartr
˙
hari was acquainted with the idea
that the parallelism between (Sanskrit) words and things is complete: not only are
there words for all things, there are also things corresponding to all (Sanskrit)
words. This idea is in agreement with a verse from the first book of the
Va¯kyapadı¯ya, which reads (Vkp 1.124):
śabdasya pariṇāmo ‘yam ity āmnāyavido viduḥ/
chandobhya eva prathamam etad viśvaṃ pravartate//
The knowers of tradition know that all this is a transformation of the word.
This universe arises originally out of the Vedas.
The second half of the above observation—“there are things corresponding to all
(Sanskrit) words”—will occupy us in this article. It is the most startling half, at least
from a modern point of view. It is demonstrably untrue for the languages we now
use, which have many words—such as “Martian”, “angel”—that do not refer to any
existing entities, not at least according to an important part of their users. It
1 The use of arthamātra, which can mean “thing in itself”, suggests that the object intuited by perception
without conceptual construction (avikalpaka) is meant. Cp. Digna¯ga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya: yoginām apy
āgamavikalpāvyatikīrṇam arthama¯tra-darśanaṃ pratyakṣam “The yogin’s intuition which is not
associated with any conceptual construction of the āgama (the authoritative words of the teachers) and
which apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception” (Hattori 1968, pp. 27, 94; Steinkellner 2005,
p. 3 l. 11).
2 Bronkhorst (1987, p. 28 l. 7–10); tr. Unebe (2011, pp. 547–548, modified).
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presupposes a language that is stable in time, and which has no place for new words
coined by its users. This may very well be the image that many Sanskrit users had of
their language.
We will see below that there are, and have been, other interpretations of Vkp
2.119. For the time being we stay with the present interpretation, and observe that
the notion according to which the existence of words tells us something about the
existence of the things named is not unknown to other Indian philosophical texts.
We find it in Buddhist thought, very clearly in Na¯ga¯rjuna’s Vigrahavyāvartanī 9,
which states it in so many words: nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāsti “for there is no noun
without corresponding thing”. The notion is also fundamental to the ontological
scheme of the Vais´es
˙
ika philosophy, of which it is one of several underlying
axioms.3
The notion appears, furthermore, in some texts belonging to the Nya¯ya school of
philosophy. Consider the following passage from Va¯tsya¯yana’s Nyāyabhāṣya. It
reads4:
The word is a means of inference; it is not a distinct means of knowledge.
– Why? Because the object of a word is inferred. – How so? Because it is not
apprehended by means of perception. A sign-possessing object, though not
apprehended, comes to be known through a knowledge of the sign; it follows
that [the sign] is a means of inference. Likewise, an object, though not
apprehended, comes to be known through a knowledge of the word by which it
is designated. Therefore, the word is a means of inference. There is also the
following reason: … when a means of knowledge is distinct, apprehension
involves two distinct processes. For apprehension takes place one way in the
case of inference and another way in the case of analogy. … But in the case of
word and inference, apprehension does not involve two processes. The process
involved in inference is the same as the process involved in word. Since there
is no difference, the word is a means of inference. … One grasps an object
through verbal knowledge when the relation between a word and the object
connected to it is well known, just as one grasps an object through inferential
knowledge when the relation between an inferential sign and the object
possessing the sign is well known.
This passage gives expression to a point of view with which the author of the
Nyāyabhāṣya is not in agreement. This is an advantage in disguise, because his
3 Bronkhorst (1992, 2011, pp. 23–29).
4 NBh 2.1.49–51 (pp. 534–535): śabdo ‘numānaṃ na pramāṇāntaram. kasmāt? śabdārthasyānumeyatvāt.
katham anumeyatvam? pratyakṣato ‘nupalabdheḥ. yathānupalabhyamāno liṅgī mitena liṅgena paścān
mīyata ity anumānam. evaṃ mitena śabdena paścān mīyate ‘rtho ‘nupalabhyamāna ity anumānaṃ
śabdaḥ. itaś cānumānaṃ śabdaḥ. …. pramāṇāntarabhāve dvipravṛttir upalabdhiḥ. anyathā hy upalabdhir
anumāne ‘nyathopamāne …. śabdānumānayos tūpalabdhir advipravṛttir yathānumāne pravartate tathā
śabde ‘pi. viśeṣābhāvād anumānaṃ śabda iti. …. saṃbaddhayoś ca śabdārthayoḥ saṃbandhaprasiddhau
śabdopalabdher arthagrahaṇaṃ yathā saṃbaddhayor liṅgaliṅginoḥ saṃbandhapratītau liṅgopalabdhau
liṅgigrahaṇam iti.
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rejection of this point of view provides us with some elements that are not clearly
expressed in the passage itself. This rejection reads5:
It is not because of words on their own that one believes in the existence of
imperceptible objects such as “heaven,” “the Apsarases,” “the Northern
Kurus,” “the seven continents,” “the ocean,” or “the shape of the world”;
rather, one believes [in their existence] because they have been spoken of by
trustworthy people. Otherwise one would not believe in them. Inference,
however, is not like this.
It is clear from this response that the author of the criticized passage believed that
various religious and mythological expressions correspond to reality simply because
those expressions are part of the Sanskrit language. Va¯tsya¯yana rejects this belief
but shows, by doing so, that some held it.
It is not clear from the above passages whether Va¯tsya¯yana believed that,
de facto, all Sanskrit words correspond to items in the real world. This is still
conceivable, because the words of the Sanskrit language were created by a
trustworthy person, viz. God himself. This would mean that the word would not by
itself be a means of inference, but the knowledge that God had created it would be a
reason to accept that the item denoted exists. And indeed, under su¯tra
1.1.4 Va¯tsya¯yana states6: “There are as many naming words as there are things.”
Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika, a commentary on the Nyāyabhāṣya, and therefore
a subcommentary on the Nyāyasūtra, gives more detailed information. Su¯tra 1.1.7
introduces the notion of reliable-teaching (āpta-upadeśa). The rules of Sanskrit
grammar allow of two ways to analyze this compound: “teaching by a reliable
person” or “teaching that is reliable”. The Nyāyabhāṣya opts for the former
interpretation, but Uddyotakara’s Nyāyavārttika introduces an opponent who
disagrees, for the following reason7:
[If we only accept teaching by a reliable person,] there would be no teaching
concerning such entities as svarga, apūrva and devatā, because these things
are beyond the senses. If reliability is the direct perception of a thing, there
would be no discourse informing us about such entities as svarga, apūrva and
devatā, since no one can see them. For this reason it is appropriate [to analyze
the compound] as “teaching that is reliable” rather than as “teaching by a
reliable person”.
Uddyotakara rejects this position, but his very rejection suggests that there were
people who held that the presence in the Sanskrit language of words such as svarga,
apūrva and devatā proves that such things exist. We will return to this issue below.
5 NBh 2.1.52 (p. 536): svargaḥ apsarasaḥ uttarāḥ kuravaḥ sapta dvīpāḥ samudro lokasaṃniveśa ity
evamāder apratyakṣasyārthasya na śabdamātrāt pratyayaḥ, kiṃ tarhi? āptair ayam uktaḥ śabda ity ataḥ
saṃpratyayaḥ, viparyayeṇa saṃpratyayābhāvāt. na tv evam anumānam iti. .
6 Nbh 1.1.4 (p. 109): yāvadarthaṃ vai nāmadheyaśabdāḥ. Note that Va¯tsya¯yana, following the su¯tra,
does not maintain that all cognition is expressible in words.
7 NV 1.1.7 (p. 174): svargāpūrvadevatādiṣūpadeśo na prāpnoti atīndriyatvāt. yadi sākṣātkaraṇam
arthasyāptiḥ, svargāpūrvadevatādīn na kaścit paśyatīti tatpratipādako vyavahāro na syāt. tasmād āptaś
cāsāv upadeśaś ceti yuktaṃ, nāptasyopadeśa iti.
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Does it follow from the passages considered that for Uddyotakara things such as
svarga, apūrva and devatā do not exist? Another passage in his Nyāyavārttika shows
that this not the case. Indeed, we learn from it that Uddyotakara does believe that
there are things corresponding to all words (na hy ekaṃ padaṃ nirarthakaṃ
paśyāmaḥ). This other passage has been discussed in another publication
(Bronkhorst 2011, pp. 119–120), but merits repetition here8:
Here, to begin with [one must say] that the two (sic!) words (pada) “the soul
does not exist” (na asti ātmā) contradict [each other]: the word “soul” (ātmā),
[even when placed] in syntactic agreement with the words “does not exist” (na
asti), does not communicate the non-existence of the soul. For with the word
“soul,” one expresses [its] existence, and with “does not exist,” its negation;
the [very] thing denied in one place appears in the other. For example, the
word “pot,” in syntactic agreement with “is not [there]” (na asti), cannot
communicate the non-existence of the pot; rather, it denies [its presence] in a
particular place or at a particular time. [The sentence] “the pot is not” (nāsti
ghaṭaḥ) denies [its presence] in a particular place, [as in the example] “it is not
in the house”; or it denies [its presence] at a particular time, [as in the
examples] “it is not [there] now,” “it was not [there] before,” “it will not be
[there] later.” None of these negations are possible for someone who does not
accept the existence of the pot. Likewise, [in the sentence] “the soul does not
exist,” is the soul denied with respect to a particular place or with respect to a
particular time?
Uddyotakara continues9:
He who denies the soul [altogether] must specify the object of the word “soul.”
Indeed, we do not see a word without an object.
We may conclude that Uddyotakara, as Va¯tsya¯yana before him, did indeed believe
that all Sanskrit words (or at least all nouns) designate something that exists in the
“outside” world. In this respect they agreed with Bhartr
˙
hari (or at least the persons
referred to by Bhartr
˙
hari in Vkp 2.119) and with the thinkers they criticize in the
passages considered. They criticized these thinkers because they were not ready to
look upon the word as a means of inference, but they agreed with them in accepting
a full correspondence between words and things.
Who were the thinkers criticized by Uddyotakara, and presumably by
Va¯tsya¯yana and Bhartr
˙
hari? The distinction between “teaching that is reliable”
and “teaching by a reliable person” must be understood in the light of the belief held
8 Uddyotakara, Nyāyavārttika introducing 3.1.1 (p. 699 l. 1 ff.): tatra nāsty ātmeti pade tāvad vyāhanyete,
nāstiśabdasamānādhikaraṇo ‘yam ātmaśabdo nātmano ‘sattvaṃ pratipādayati. kiṃ kāraṇam? ātmeti
sattvam abhidhīyate, nāstīti tasya pratiṣedhaḥ, yac ca yatra pratiṣidhyate tat tasmād anyatrāsti, yathā
nāstinā samānādhikaraṇo ghaṭaśabdo na ghaṭābhāvaṃ pratipādayituṃ śaknoti, api tu deśakālaviśeṣe
pratiṣedhati. nāsti ghaṭa iti deśaviśeṣe vā pratiṣedho gehe nāstīti, kālaviśeṣe vā pratiṣedha idānīṃ nāstīti
prāṅ nāsti ūrdhvaṃ nāstīti. sarvaś cāyaṃ pratiṣedho nānabhyupagataghaṭasattvasya yuktaḥ. tathā nāsty
ātmeti kim ayaṃ deśaviśeṣe pratiṣidhyate atha kālaviśeṣe iti.
9 Ibid., p. 701 l. 5–6: ātmapratiṣedhaṃ ca kurvāṇenātmaśabdasya viṣayo vaktavyaḥ. na hy ekaṃ padaṃ
nirarthakaṃ paśyāmaḥ.
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by some in classical India that the Veda has no author. The Veda, according to those
who held this belief, contains reliable teaching, but is not the teaching of or by one
or more reliable persons. The belief in the authorlessness of the Veda is
characteristic of Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, the school of Vedic interpretation. This suggests that
Uddyotakara’s opponent is a Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka.
This impression is confirmed by the presence of apūrva in the list of items
enumerated. Apūrva is a technical term of Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, which designates the
Unprecedented Potency responsible for the future outcome of sacrificial activity.
We are entitled to conclude that Uddyotakara and Bhartr
˙
hari, and perhaps
Va¯tsya¯yana too,10 refer to a position that was or had been held by Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas.
However, these Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas differed from S´abara, the author of the surviving
Mīmāṃsābhāṣya (or Śābara-Bhāṣya). This text was composed around the middle of
the first millennium CE, roughly during the time in which also Bhartr
˙
hari lived and
wrote. There are reasons to think that Bhartr
˙
hari was not yet acquainted with
S´abara’s Bhāṣya, or that he ignored it. He may have used earlier Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ works,
most notably the Vṛtti of Bhavada¯sa.11 This is to be kept in mind in what follows.
S´abara agrees in principle with the idea that the Veda is always correct12:
It is a contradiction to say “[the Vedic word] speaks” and “incorrectly”. When
one says “it speaks”, this means “it makes known”, that it is the cause that [the
thing] is known.
However, S´abara applies this idea only to injunctions. He does not, for example,
claim that the occurrence of the words svarga, apūrva and devatā in the Sanskrit
language (more precisely: in the Veda) constitutes proof that the corresponding
entities must exist. Quite on the contrary, he comes close to denying the existence of
two of them (heaven and deities). And in order to prove the existence of apūrva, he
resorts to an altogether different line of reasoning.
Consider the case of svarga13:
10 The evidence provided by Va¯tsya¯yana is less decisive: the arguments that allow us to identify
Uddyotakara’s opponent as a Mı¯ma¯m
˙
saka (interpretation of āpta-upadeśa; apūrva) cannot be use to
identify Va¯tsya¯yana’s opponent. Va¯tsya¯yana’s opponent, moreover, explicitly states that the word is a
means of inference. Taber (1996, pp. 22–23) may therefore be right in thinking that Va¯tsya¯yana rather
criticizes the Buddhist Digna¯ga or those who had been influenced by his thought. Note however that
already Bhartr
˙
hari—in the passage from his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya which we studied above—
speaks of inference as the means to conclude that imperceptible things exist on the basis of words such as
svarga, apūrva, and devatā; Bhartr
˙
hari lived before Digna¯ga. We cannot exclude that Va¯tsya¯yana
criticizes Bhartr
˙
hari (or his Mīmāṃsā source?).
11 Bronkhorst (1989).
12 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 1.1.2 (Frauwallner 1968, p. 16 l. 18–19): vipratiṣiddham idam abhidhīyate “bravīti ca
vitathaṃ ca” iti. bravīti ity ucyate ‘vabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavati iti. Cf. Bronkhorst
(1997, p. 367).
13 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 6.1.1 (p. 177 l. 9–21): nanu svargaśabdo loke prasiddho viśiṣṭe deśe. yasmin noṣṇaṃ, na
śītaṃ, na kṣud, na tṛṣṇā, nāratiḥ, na glāniḥ, puṇyakṛta eva pretya tatra gacchanti nānye. atrocyate. yadi
tatra kecid amṛtvā na gacchanti tata āgacchanty ajanitvā vā na tarhi sa pratyakṣo deśa evaṃjātīyakaḥ.
nāpy anumānād gamyate, nānyena. nanu cānye siddhā kecid dṛṣṭavantaḥ te cākhyātavanta iti cet. na tatra
pramāṇam asti siddhā evaṃjātīyakāḥ santi te ca dṛṣṭvācakṣīrann iti. tasmād evaṃjātīyako deśa eva nāsti.
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[Objection:] The word ‘heaven’ is well known in the world to refer to a
specific place, in which there is no heat, no cold, no hunger, no thirst, no
dissatisfaction, no depression, and where those who have done good deeds go
after death, but no others.
The answer is as follows. If no people go there without having died, or come
from there without having been born, such a place is not accessible to the
senses. Nor is it known from inference, nor by any other [means].
[Objection:] Some people with occult powers, different [from us], have seen
[heaven] and have talked [about it].
[Answer:] There is no proof that there are such people with occult powers, and
that they, having seen [heaven], talk [about it]. No such place therefore exists.
[Objection:] We learn from [people in] the world, from stories and from the
Veda that there is such a place called ‘heaven’.
[Reply:] This is not [acceptable]. The words of people constitute no proof,
because they have no contact with such a place. Nor should stories be heeded,
because they have been composed by human beings. Even the Vedic stories
about heaven do not occur in injunctions. They are eulogies to be construed
with an injunction different from them.
Two things strike us in this passage. First of all, S´abara does not as much as mention
the argument according to which the existence of heaven is proved by the existence
of the word ‘heaven’. Second, S´abara comes close to rejecting the notion of heaven
altogether.
S´abara’s discussion of deities confronts us with a similar situation. S´abara first
lets an opponent speak who claims that deities play a role in connecting sacrifice
with its fruits.14 S´abara rejects all the opponent’s arguments under su¯tra 9.1.9, and
leaves us with the impression that he puts the very existence of deities into doubt.
There is no question here of S´abara saying that the word devatā itself proves the
existence of deities.
As a matter of fact, S´abara’s elaborate discussion reminds us that in his form of
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯, the Veda does not provide information about entities: only injunctions
must be taken literally, and everything else has to be read along with and in the light
of those injunctions. It follows that the Veda contains no reliable teaching as to the
existence of deities, heaven and apūrva.
S´abara discusses apūrva under su¯tra 2.1.5. This time he does not reject the
existence of this entity, but presents arguments to show its existence. Among these
arguments we do not find the one that claims that the word apūrva proves its
existence.
What can we conclude from all this? It seems beyond doubt that, leaving aside
the Buddhists, there were Brahmanical thinkers in India who held that the
occurrence of a word in Sanskrit (more precisely: in the Veda) is proof of the
Footnote 13 continued
nanu ca lokād ākhyānebhyo vedāc cāvagamyate, deśa evaṃjātīyakaḥ svarga iti. tan na. puruṣāṇām
evaṃvidhena deśenāsaṃbandhād apramāṇaṃ vacaḥ. ākhyānam api puruṣapraṇītatvād anādaraṇīyam.
vaidikam api svargākhyānaṃ vidhiparaṃ nāsty eva. bhavati tu vidhyantareṇaikavākyabhūtaṃ stutiparam.
14 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 9.1.8 (pp. 74 l. 16–75 l. 3).
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existence of the corresponding entity. This position is still known to, and
presumably held by, the Naiya¯yikas Va¯tsya¯yana and Uddyotakara, and of course
to Bhartr
˙
hari. It had also been held by Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas, but not by the followers of
S´abara (or by S´abara himself). Perhaps they were Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas who preceded
S´abara. We know from Jayanta Bhat
˙
t
˙
a’s Nyāyamañjarī that this author was still
aware of “old Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas” (vṛddhamīmāṃsaka) who held opinions different from
the “followers of S´abara” (śābara).15 Perhaps Bhavada¯sa was one of these earlier
Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas. S´abara, however, abandoned this position.
Our conclusion thus far is confirmed by a discussion at the beginning of the
Śābara-Bhāṣya. This discussion concerns the meaning of the word dharma, a
crucial term in Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯. Based on what ground do we have knowledge of dharma?
Three su¯tras (1.1.3–5) deal with this issue, and interestingly, S´abara provides two
altogether different commentaries on these three su¯tras. The first commentary is
short, and amounts to this that the word (i.e., the word dharma) is the ground on
which the knowledge of dharma is based. The second commentary is long, and has
been taken, with acknowledgment, from a commentator about whom we know no
more than that S´abara calls him Vr
˙
ttika¯ra (“commentator”). It seems safe to think
that the first commentary was the traditional one. The second commentary, the one
attributed to the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra, on the other hand, takes on all sorts of new ideas, and
strays considerably from the su¯tras it is supposed to explain. It contains a number of
remarks that are of interest in our present context.
Consider first the presumably traditional explanation of the su¯tras. S´abara points
out, under su¯tra 1.1.4, that perception (pratyakṣa) cannot be the ground on which
our knowledge of dharma is based. Introducing su¯tra 1.1.5, he then adds that
inference (anumāna), analogy (upamāna), presumption (arthāpatti) and absence
(abhāva) cannot be its cause either, because these are preceded by perception. In his
comments on that su¯tra he tells us what its ground is16: “The eternal link of the word
with its object is the ground on which that dharma, which is of the nature of the
Agnihotra sacrifice and so on, unknown by means of perception etc., is based.” He
explains this in the following lines17:
For it is instruction. ‘Instruction’ (upadeśa) is what we call the pronouncement
of specific words. And this knowledge does not go wrong. For this knowledge,
once arisen, does not change into its opposite. And of knowledge that, once
arisen, does not change into its opposite one cannot say “it is not like this”, “it
is not as it is known”, “it is as it is not known”. One would have in that case
one thing in one’s mind, and something else in one’s speech. From someone
15 Jayanta Bhat
˙
t
˙
a, Nyāyamañjarī p. 664: vṛddhamīmāṃsakāḥ yāgādikarmanirvartyam apūrvaṃ nāma
dharmam abhivadanti yāgādikarmaiva śābarā bruvate. Cf. Bronkhorst (1989, p. 113 [384]).
16 Frauwallner (1968, p. 24 l. 5–6): autpattikaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādilakṣaṇasya
dharmasya nimittaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagatasya.
17 Frauwallner (1968, p. 24 l. 7–14): upadeśo hi bhavati. upadeśa iti viśiṣṭasya śabdasya uccāraṇam.
avyatirekaś ca bhavati tasya jñānasya. na hi tad utpannaṃ jñānaṃ viparyeti. yac ca nāma jñānam
utpannaṃ na viparyeti, na tac chakyate vaktuṃ “naitad evam” iti, “yathā vijñāyate, na tathā bhavati”;
“yathaitan na vijñāyate, tathaitad” iti. anyad asya hṛdaye, anyad vāci syāt. evaṃ vadato viruddham idam
avagamyate “asti nāsti ca” iti. tasmāt tat pramāṇam, anapekṣatvāt. na hy evaṃ sati pratyayāntaram
apekṣitavyaṃ puruṣāntaraṃ vā.
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who speaks like that one would learn contradictory things, viz., “it is” and “it
is not”. It is therefore a means of cognition, because it is independent. For,
such being the case, no other knowledge will be required, nor another person.
In other words, on the basis of the word dharma we know that dharma exists.
The second commentary on su¯tras 1.1.3–5—the so-called Vṛttikāra-grantha, and
not therefore by S´abara—is harder to interpret with confidence. On the link between
words and things the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra says the following18: “The link, not made by humans,
of the word with its object is the [cause of] knowledge of the thing of the nature of
the Agnihotra sacrifice and so on (i.e. of dharma) unknown by means of perception
etc.” This, of course, is close to what S´abara had said. But it is not certain that it
means quite the same thing, for the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra adds19: “In this way there is correct
knowledge that is of the nature of an injunction.” It appears that the knowledge
directly derived from words here only concerns injunctions, not the existence of
items for which there is a Sanskrit word. The Vr
˙
ttika¯ra adds a further explanation, as
follows20:
If the link were to have been made by humans, the knowledge could be
suspected of being incorrect, because it would then be the knowledge of
someone else. But if the word itself speaks, how could it be incorrect? In that
case the knowledge does not come from another person. When one says “he
speaks”, this means “he makes known”, that he is the cause that [the thing] is
known. If, because the word itself is the cause, one understands of one’s own,
how could it state a falsehood of the form “it is not like that”?
I am not sure whether this throws further light on the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra’s intentions. The
then following lines do, and they show that injunctions and nothing else were on his
mind. We read here, for example, “An injunction does not create a doubt of the kind
‘it may be the case, or not’”,21 contrasting the injunction with items of information
one may obtain through other means of cognition. The passage concludes with an
unambiguous remark: “It follows that the dharma is exclusively of the nature of
injunctions.”22 Almost the same remark is repeated later on in the Vṛttikāra-grantha
(“It follows that the dharma is exclusively of the nature of injunctions and nothing
18 Frauwallner (1968, p. 34 l. 15–17): apauruṣeyaḥ śabdasyārthena saṃbandhas tasya agnihotrādi-
lakṣaṇasya arthasya jñānaṃ pratyakṣādibhir anavagamyamānasya.
19 Frauwallner (1968, p. 17): tathā ca codanālakṣaṇaḥ samyakpratyaya iti.
20 Frauwallner (1968, p. 34 l. 17–22): pauruṣeye hi sati saṃbandhe yaḥ pratyayaḥ, tasya mithyābhāva
āśaṅkyeta. parapratyayo hi tadā syāt. atha śabde bruvati kathaṃ mithyā iti? na hi tadānīm anyataḥ
puruṣād avagamaḥ. “bravīti” ity ucyate “avabodhayati, budhyamānasya nimittaṃ bhavati” iti. śabde cen
nimittabhūte svayam avabudhyate, kathaṃ vipralabdhaṃ brūyān “naitad evam” iti. See also footnote 12,
above.
21 Frauwallner (1968, p. 34 l. 22–23): na cāsya codanā “syād vā na vā” iti sāṃśayikaṃ pratyayam
utpādayati.
22 Frauwallner (1968, p. 36 l. 4–5): tasmāc codanālakṣaṇa eva dharmaḥ. The reason justifying this
conclusion appears to be that only injunctions cannot possibly be contradicted by other means of
knowledge, but the passage is obscure.
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else”).23 The accent has clearly shifted from knowing dharma to knowing that
dharma is exclusively of the nature of injunctions.
Interestingly, the question of deities and other unobservable entities comes up in
the Vṛttikāra-grantha, too. But far from using words like devatā to prove that deities
must exist, the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra uses them to prove that words have not been created by a
name-giver24: “In the case of unobserved things, such as deities and so on, the
giving of a name is pointless and impossible.” This line does not tell us whether the
Vr
˙
ttika¯ra believed that deities exist, for deities cannot be observed, whether they
exist or not.
One does have the impression that in these passages the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra avoids the issue
to some extent. He yet engages in a discussion with thinkers—probably
Ca¯rva¯kas25—who are very explicit about their denial of the necessary existence
of things for which there is a word. It is in this discussion that he is forced to clarify
his position: “We do not designate the word ‘I’, when used, as ground for [the
existence of] some other object, but rather the recognizing knowledge that is
different from the word.”26 In other words, we do not claim that the soul exists
because there is a word, ‘I’, that refers to it. Here, then, the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra comes out in
the open: he draws no ontological conclusions from the existence of words. We
know that S´abara followed him in this.
According to S´abara, the sole referent of a word is the ākṛti ‘form’.27 Ākṛti is a
synonym of ākāra, the term used by Bhartr
˙
hari to state that its “grasping as a result
of repeatedly observing the use of a word is not the realm of words, for it is based on
a different effort”. In other words, Bhartr
˙
hari refers to an opinion according to
which ākṛti is not the sole referent of a word. Worse, ākṛti is not a referent at all; it is
grasped by means of a different effort altogether.
S´abara’s Bhāṣya is aware of the position according to which words refer to
individuals, not to forms or universals. S´abara criticizes this position under su¯tra
1.3.30, but not without giving his opponent occasion to defend it. The opponent
most notably explains how it is possible that we also understand the universal
(sāmānya) when hearing a word. His answer: The form (ākṛti) is a sign of the
individual, but only the individual is the referent of the word.28
This same opponent is given more space under su¯tra 1.3.33. He there argues that
the word designates an individual without designating its universal and specifics, but
23 Frauwallner (1968, p. 48 l. 13–14): tasmāc codanālakṣaṇa eva dharmo nānyalakṣaṇaḥ. The reason
here is that only injunctions are independent of other people and of other cognitions.
24 Frauwallner (1968, p. 48 l. 7): anupalabdhe ca devatādāv arthe ‘narthakaṃ sajñākaraṇam aśakyaṃ ca.
25 Bronkhorst (2007, p. 363 f).
26 Frauwallner (1968, p. 56 l. 7–9): na vayam “aham” itīmaṃ śabdaṃ prayujyamānam anyasmin arthe
hetutvena vyapadiśāmaḥ, kiṃ tarhi śabdād vyatiriktaṃ pratyabhijñāpratyayam.
27 Mı¯Bh on su¯tras 1.3.30–35 (pp. 235–268). On the precise interpretation of ākṛti, see the following note.
28 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 1.3.30 (p. 244 l. 2–4): kathaṃ sāmānyāvagatir iti cet. vyaktipadārthasyākṛtiś cihnabhūtā
bhaviṣyati, ya evamākṛtikaḥ, sa gaur iti. yathā yasya daṇḍo 'sti, sa daṇḍīti, na ca daṇḍavacano
daṇḍiśabdaḥ. evam ihāpi. In other words, one grasps the form “based on a different effort”. Note further
that this passage uses sāmānya ‘universal’ and ākṛti ‘form’ as synonyms, and cp. Deshpande (1992,
pp. 19–22) and Scharf (1990, p. 249 ff.).
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an individual nonetheless that is the substrate of a universal and of specifics.29
Moreover, in spite of the fact that no universal and no specifics are denoted, a word
cannot designate just any individual—the word ‘cow’ does not denote a horse,
because it is the nature of the denotative power of words to apply to certain
individuals, not to others.30
The question we have to raise, but cannot answer with certainty, is whether the
“old Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas”, i.e., the Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sakas preceding the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra and S´abara,
agreed with Bhartr
˙
hari also in this further point: Apart from believing that there
would be an existing thing corresponding to every Sanskrit word, did they also
believe that words denote individuals, not forms? An affirmative answer to this
question looks plausible, but does not rest on any evidence known to me beyond
Bhartr
˙
hari’s verse.
Assuming that the above attempt at reconstructing early Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ is correct, is it
possible to find out why S´abara, and the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra before him, introduced so radical a
change into Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ thinking? A close reading of S´abara’s discussion of the
existence of deities (devatā) may help us find an answer. A few times in his
commentary on su¯tra 9.1.9 S´abara speaks of deva- or devatā-paricārakas
(sometimes just paricārakas). He tells us various things about these “attendants
of the deity”. The attendants of the god derive their maintenance from what has been
donated to the deity.31 The context reveals that what is at stake are devagrāmas and
devakṣetras, villages and fields given to the deity. S´abara points out that no deity is
involved in such deals, and that he who is entitled to use the village or field
concerned, not the deity, is its owner.32 S´abara further informs us that people
believe that the attendants use the riches that belong to the deity in accordance with
its wishes, but it is as clear as daylight to S´abara that the attendants act in
accordance with their own wishes.33
The context in which these passages occur deals with the questions whether
deities have bodies, whether they can eat, and whether they can own property.
S´abara’s answer is three times no. The passages suggest that more than a mere
theoretical issue is at stake. S´abara is obviously critical of those who make a living
out of the deities, by being their attendants, feeding them, and looking after their
property. These attendants were in all probability Brahmanical temple-priests,34 and
29 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 1.3.33 (p. 247 l. 2–4): vyaktivacanaś ca śabdo na sāmānye, na viśeṣe vartate. teṣāṃ tv
āśrayam evābhidadhāti, tena vyaktyantare vṛttir adoṣaḥ.
30 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 1.3.33 (p. 247 l. 12–15): evaṃ tarhi śakteḥ svabhāva eṣaḥ, yat kasyāṃcit vyaktau
vartate, kasyāṃcin na. yathā - agnir uṣṇaḥ, udakaṃ śītam, evam etad bhaviṣyatīti.
31 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 9.1.9 (p. 80 l. 1–2): devaparicārakāṇāṃ tu tato bhṛtir bhavati devatām uddiśya yat
tyaktam.
32 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 9.1.9 (p. 79 l. 25–26): yo yad abhipretaṃ viniyoktum arhati tat tasya svam. na ca
grāmaṃ kṣetraṃ vā yathābhiprāyaṃ viniyuṅkte devatā.
33 Mı¯Bh on su¯tra 9.1.9 (p. 80 l. 5–12): tatrāhuḥ. vacanaprāmāṇyād evāsyeśānatā ‘vagamyate, yad eva
lokā arthān viniyuñjate tad devatābhiprāyād evety adhyavasyāma iti. tan na. pratyakṣāt pramāṇād
devatāparicārakāṇām abhiprāya ity avagamyate. sa na śakyate bādhitum. ye ‘pi devatām īśānāṃ
varṇayanti te ‘pi nāpahnuvate paricārakāṇām abhiprāyam. kiṃ cāhuḥ. tathā devatā karoti yathā
paricārakāṇām abhiprāyo bhavatīti. na ca sa īśāno bhavati yaḥ parābhiprāyam anurudhyate, yasya na
svābhiprāyād viniyogo bhavati.
34 This is indeed how Ganganatha Jha (1933, p. 1436) translates paricāraka.
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the contempt in Brahmanical circles for temple-priests is well known and has
survived until today. In S´abara’s days they may have been a relatively new
phenomenon, so much so that S´abara felt called upon to reject whatever justification
for their occupation the Brahmanical temple-priests may have invoked. Their
principal justification was, obviously, the existence of deities that needed to be fed
and looked after.35
S´abara’s dislike for this new development was evidently strong enough to induce
him, or perhaps rather the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra, to introduce major changes in Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯
thinking. Before these two, Mı¯ma¯m
˙
sa¯ presumably did not object to the existence of
heaven and deities, and what is more: it accepted the existence of everything for
which there is a word in the Sanskrit language. With the Vr
˙
ttika¯ra and S´abara this
principle had to be abandoned. The existence of things for which the Sanskrit
language had a word was no longer guaranteed by that very fact, and arguments, or
reliable testimony, were henceforth required.
The reason for this profound philosophical change, it may be recalled, appears to
have been a socio-religious development in the subcontinent. Increasingly, deities
came to be venerated in temples, and worse: more and more temple-priests claimed
Brahmanical status (or the other way round: more and more Brahmins took up the
job of temple-priests). This was an obvious threat to Vedic orthodoxy (and
orthopraxy), and S´abara and (no doubt) many of his fellow Brahmins did what they
could to stop this new trend. With hindsight, it appears that they engaged in a battle
for a lost cause: the role of deities worshipped in temples became ever stronger in
Brahmanism over time. However, one consequence (if the thesis presented in this
paper is correct) is that Brahmanism abandoned its early position regarding the
relation between words and things, and removed most of the traces of the earlier
situation.
A consequence of this changed philosophical position is visible in the way in
which Bhartr
˙
hari’s Vkp 2.119 came to be interpreted by more recent authors.36
Mallava¯din’s Dvādaśāranayacakra, for example, cites this verse to illustrate that,
from a certain point of view, the meaning of the word is unknown.37 Sim
˙
hasu¯ri
comments38:
yatha¯ ca¯huh
˙
: asty arthah
˙
sarvas´abda¯na¯m iti ślokaḥ. sattāmātram arthaḥ
sarvaśabdānām, ko’py asyārtho ‘sti, na nirarthakaḥ śabdaḥ, sa punar artho na
nirūpayituṃ śakyaḥ ‘ayam ayam’ iti, etat pratya¯yyalaks
˙
an
˙
am. tatra dṛṣṭānto
‘pu¯rvadevata¯svargaśabdānām arthāḥ, yathā teṣām atyantāparidṛṣṭatvāt ‘īdṛśo
‘pūrvaḥ svargo devatā vedṛśī’ iti na pratipadyāmahe nirūpaṇena tathā
35 Willis (2009, p. 6) reverses the causality: “gifts to bra¯hman
˙
as learned in the Veda were sanctioned by
tradition, so formalised land-grants were not seen as contentious when they were introduced in the fourth
century. Grants to temples, however, were fraught. This was because temple deities were not regarded as
‘real’ by the Vedic priesthood.”
36 See Unebe (2009, 2011).
37 DNC I p. 114 l. 1–3: tasmād etasmin nayabhaṅge ‘jñāta eva śabdasyārthaḥ. yathāhuḥ: asty arthaḥ
sarvaśabdānām iti pratyāyyalakṣaṇam. apūrvadevatāśabdaiḥ samam āhur gavādiṣu. Cp. Houben (2008,
p. 88).
38 DNC I p. 114 l. 9–13.
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gavādiśabdānām apy arthais tatsamair eva bhavitavyam, na hi gamanaga-
danagarjanādiṣv arthavyavasthā viśeṣarūpeti ‘kaścid asty arthaḥ’ ity etāvat
pratipattavyam.
“As they say: asty arthaḥ sarvaśabdānām …”. This is a śloka [from
Bhartr
˙
hari’s Va¯kyapadı¯ya]. Mere being is the meaning/object of all words.
A word has some meaning, it is not without meaning. This meaning cannot
however be articulated, [so that one could say] “it is this, or that”; this is the
characteristic of what is to be conveyed. An example is [constituted by] the
meanings of the words apūrva, devatā and svarga. Just as we do not cognize
[their objects] in an articulated manner, [so that we can say] “apūrva is like
this, svarga is like this, or devatā is like that”, this because they are completely
imperceptible, in the same way the meanings/objects of words such as go
‘cow’ must be similar, for the establishment of the object is not specific with
regard to [features that characterize a cow] such as going, lowing and roaring.
All that will be cognized is “there is some meaning/object”.
This, as I have argued above, is not Bhartr
˙
hari’s own interpretation of this kārikā.
Rather than the individual, Sim
˙
hasu¯ri (and presumably Mallava¯din) look upon
“mere being” (sattāmātra; notice the difference from Pun
˙
yara¯ja’s arthamātra) as the
referent of a word.
Unebe (2009, 2011) discusses various other Sanskrit authors who interpret Vkp
2.119 in a way that deviates from what we consider Bhartr
˙
hari’s original intention.
One could add various modern translators who do the same.39 None of them opt for
the simplest and most direct interpretation, and none of them knew (or admitted)
that Bhartr
˙
hari’s kārikā gave expression to a point of view that in the changing times
had come to be abandoned, and might have become unimaginable.
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